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and Property of Nonclients 
Abstract.  Issues arise daily in law practice about the duties owed by lawyers 
to nonclients with respect to funds or property entrusted to them.  In resolving 
those issues, care must be exercised when interpreting state versions of Model 
Rule 1.15, the American Bar Association’s pattern ethics rule on safekeeping of 
funds and property.  Otherwise, a lawyer’s duties to third persons may too 
readily encroach on the performance of obligations owed to clients, as well as 
on the legitimate interests of lawyers themselves. 
As numerous authorities have recognized, lawyers are obliged to protect the 
property interests of third persons only if they possess a “matured legal or 
equitable interest” in the specific funds or property held by the lawyer.  To be 
entitled to protection (by way of safekeeping, notice, delivery, or sequestration 
in escrow), a third person must be known by the lawyer to hold an interest in 
the relevant funds or property by way of assignment, lien, court order, 
judgment, statute, or letter of protection.  Anything less normally will not 
suffice.  In particular, the assertion of an unmatured claim by an unsecured 
creditor does not require a lawyer to act in a manner inconsistent with the 
instructions of the lawyer’s client. 
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I.    UNEXPECTEDLY NARROW OR BROAD ETHICS RULES 
Certain rules of legal ethics, upon close examination, have a narrower or 
broader reach than one might expect.  Consider, for example, the rules that 
impose on lawyers duties to report misconduct by other lawyers1 or judges2 
to disciplinary authorities.3  Although these rules are typically worded in 
mandatory terms (using the phrase “shall inform”4) and cover a wide range 
of professional misconduct (including any conduct that raises a substantial 
question as to a “lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in 
other respects,”5 or a “judge’s fitness for office”6), the compulsory 
reporting obligations do not apply in a broad range of cases, even if those 
situations involve egregious conduct.7  This is true because the reporting 
 
1. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.3(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017) (“A lawyer who 
knows that another lawyer has committed a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct that raises 
a substantial question as to that lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, 
shall inform the appropriate professional authority.”). 
2. See id. r. 8.3(b) (“A lawyer who knows that a judge has committed a violation of applicable 
rules of judicial conduct that raises a substantial question as to the judge’s fitness for office shall inform 
the appropriate authority.”). 
3. Similar reporting obligations are imposed on judges by rules of judicial ethics.  See In re J.B.K., 
931 S.W.2d 581, 584 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1996, no writ) (“A judge who receives information clearly 
establishing that a lawyer has committed a violation of the Texas Rules of Professional Conduct should 
take appropriate action.  If the information received by that judge raises a substantial question as to 
the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, the judge shall inform the 
Office of the General Counsel of the State Bar of Texas or take other appropriate action.” (citing TEX. 
CODE JUD. CONDUCT, Canon 3(B)(5), reprinted in TEX. GOV. CODE ANN., tit. 2, subtit. G, app. B 
(West Supp. 1996))). 
4. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.3(a)–(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017); see also Attorney 
Grievance Comm’n of Md. v. Ruddy, 981 A.2d 637, 658 (Md. 2009) (“MPRC 8.3 applies to all lawyers, 
whether or not they are members of the Attorney Grievance Commission.”); Baxt v. Liloia, 714 A.2d 
271, 281–82 (N.J. 1998) (“RPC 8.3(a) requires that ‘[a] lawyer having knowledge that another lawyer 
has committed a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a substantial question as to 
that lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, shall inform the 
appropriate professional authority.’  Grove’s attorney should have reported the violations alleged 
herein to the Office of Attorney Ethics . . . or the local District Ethics Committee at the time they 
occurred.”); In re Garringer, 626 N.E.2d 809, 812 (Ind. 1994) (finding the duty to report applies only 
to “misconduct such as to remove them from the realm of mere speculation and conjecture”). 
5. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.3(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017). 
6. Id. r. 8.3(b). 
7. Cf. Ill. State Bar Ass’n, Informal Op. 01-04 (2002) (“Although keeping the money after its 
ownership has clearly been established may raise a strong suspicion of the intent to permanently 
deprive, these facts [are] insufficient to establish knowledge of lawyer theft.  The lawyers who act as 
bar association officers are under no duty to report the attorney’s conduct to the ARDC.”); In re Ethics 
Advisory Panel, Op. No. 92-1, 627 A.2d 317, 323 (R.I. 1993) (“Rule 8.3 expressly exempts from the 
reporting requirement confidential information under Rule 1.6 . . . .  This is not to say that we are not 
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rules do “not require disclosure of information otherwise protected by Rule 
1.6[,]”8 the rule requiring that lawyers maintain the confidentiality of 
information learned while representing clients.9  The confidentiality 
obligations of lawyers are extensive,10 among the most demanding in the 
law of attorney professional responsibility.11  In many situations, the duty 
of client confidentiality trumps the so-called “mandatory” duty to assist 
disciplinary authorities in policing the profession by reporting 
misconduct.12  Thus, the duty to report professional misconduct is 
surprisingly narrow.13 
 
concerned with the ramifications of this decision.  In this case a lawyer has engaged in criminal conduct 
as well as violated the Rules of Professional Conduct.”). 
8. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.3(c) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017).  Rule 8.3 also does 
not require disclosure of information “gained by a lawyer or judge while participating in an approved 
lawyers assistance program.”  Id. 
9. See 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 60 (AM. LAW 
INST. 2000) (discussing the duties of lawyers to safeguard confidential client information); see also 
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017) (“A lawyer shall not reveal 
information relating to the representation of a client unless the client gives informed consent, the 
disclosure is impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation or the disclosure is permitted 
by paragraph (b).”).  
10. See Leah M. Christensen, A Comparison of the Duty of Confidentiality and the Attorney-Client 
Privilege in the U.S. and China: Developing a Rule of Law, 34 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 171, 171 (2011) (“A 
lawyer’s duty of confidentiality is an ethical rule that requires a lawyer to hold in strict confidence all 
information concerning the business and affairs of the client acquired during the course of the 
professional relationship.  Further, the lawyer shall not divulge such information unless expressly or 
impliedly authorized by the client, required by law, or otherwise permitted or required by the relevant 
rules of professional conduct.” (footnotes omitted) (citing MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6 
(AM. BAR ASS’N 2017))). 
11. See 1 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING § 9.2, 
at 9-5 (3d ed. 2001) (stating confidentiality is a “core rule” of lawyering); 2 RONALD E. MALLEN, 
LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 17:11 (2017) (“The duty of confidentiality is foundational to the 
attorney-client relationship . . . .”); JEFFREY M. SMITH & RONALD E. MALLEN, PREVENTING LEGAL 
MALPRACTICE 178 (2d ed. 1996) (discussing the “duty to prevent the unauthorized disclosure of 
confidential, secret and privileged information”); see also ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l 
Responsibility, Formal Op. 17-477, at 3–10 (2017) (discussing the confidentiality obligations of lawyers 
related to the transmission of client information); Ohio Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline, 
Op. 2009-6, at 4 (2009) (“Client confidentiality is a hallmark of the attorney[-]client relationship.”). 
12. See In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Schafer, 66 P.3d 1036, 1043 (Wash. 2003) 
(“RPC 8.3 creates a permissive, not mandatory, disclosure when confidences and secrets under 
RPC 1.6 are concerned.” (citing MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.3(c) (AM. BAR 
ASS’N 2017))). 
13. See Vincent R. Johnson, Legal Malpractice Litigation and the Duty to Report Misconduct, 1 ST. 
MARY’S J. ON LEGAL MAL. & ETHICS 40, 50–53 (2011) (discussing the narrow duty to report and 
arguing that “[d]oubts about the importance of the mandatory reporting rule are . . . raised by broad 
exceptions to the duty . . . and by the uncertain contours of the reporting obligation”).  But see In re 
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At the other end of the spectrum, consider the rule that bars a lawyer 
from communicating about the subject matter of representation with a 
person already represented by counsel.14  The no-communication rule is 
broader than what many persons might anticipate.  As this author noted on 
an earlier occasion: 
Two facets of the ABA Model Rule on communication with a represented 
person are striking.  First, within its scope, the Rule states an absolute 
prohibition, rather than a restriction on time, place, or manner.  Second, the 
demands of the Rule cannot be waived by the represented person whose 
interests are at stake.  It makes no difference whether the opposing lawyer 
treated the represented party unfairly or even whether the represented person, 
rather than the adverse lawyer, initiated the exchange.  Any communication 
about the subject matter of the representation is wholly banned, except as 
allowed by law or by consent of the represented person’s counsel.15 
Under the no-communication rule, a version of which exists in “every 
American jurisdiction[,]”16 a represented person has no power to waive the 
benefits of the rule by agreeing to speak about the subject matter of the 
representation with any lawyer other than the one the client has engaged to 
provide legal services.17  Consequently, the rule does more than protect the 
 
Riehlmann, 891 So. 2d 1239, 1239 (La. 2005) (reprimanding a lawyer publicly for failure to promptly 
report a former prosecutor’s professional misconduct).   
14. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4.2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017) (“In representing a 
client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the subject of the representation with a person the lawyer 
knows to be represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other 
lawyer or is authorized to do so by law or a court order.”); see also 2 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE 
LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 99 (AM. LAW INST. 2000) (“A lawyer representing a client in a matter 
may not communicate about the subject of the representation with a nonclient whom the lawyer knows 
to be represented in the matter by another lawyer . . . unless: (a) the communication is with a public 
officer or agency to the extent stated in § 101; (b) the lawyer is a party and represents no other client 
in the matter; (c) the communication is authorized by law; (d) the communication reasonably responds 
to an emergency; or (e) the other lawyer consents.”). 
15. Vincent R. Johnson, The Ethics of Communicating with Putative Class Members, 17 REV. LITIG. 
497, 502–03 (1998) [hereinafter Ethics of Communicating] (footnotes omitted) (citing ABA Comm. on 
Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 95-396 (1995); United States v. Lopez, 765 F. Supp. 1433 
(N.D. Cal. 1991), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 4 F.3d 1455, 1462 (9th Cir. 1993); In re News Am. 
Publ’g, Inc., 974 S.W.2d 97, 100 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, pet. granted) (en banc), reh’g overruled 
sub nom, In re Users Sys. Servs., 22 S.W.3d 331 (Tex. 1999); In re McCaffrey, 549 P.2d 666, 668 
(Or. 1976); ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 95-396 (1995)). 
16. Id. at 500 (citing Lopez, 765 F. Supp. at 1448–49). 
17. See News Am. Publ’g, 974 S.W.2d at 97 (“[O]pposing counsel violated [the] anticontact rule 
by meeting with party after receiving party’s unilateral statement that he had terminated his own 
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client from over-reaching by an attorney representing another party in the 
same matter.18  At least in part, the no-communication rule also protects the 
represented person’s lawyer from harm that the lawyer might suffer as a result of 
interference with the ongoing representation.19  Indeed, as between the 
interests of the client and the lawyer, the interests of the lawyer seem to 
come first.20  Only the represented person’s lawyer—not the represented 
 
attorney-client relationship and wished to engage in discussions without his ‘former’ lawyer present”); 
see also Giel Stein, Weathering the Worst Storm: How Attorneys Might Successfully Defend Their Reputation Against 
Attack from the Bench, 6 ST. MARY’S J. ON LEGAL MAL. & ETHICS 284, 297 (2016) (discussing a situation 
where “a third-party witness appeared without his lawyer at a deposition and proceeded to volunteer 
that his lawyer and a state prosecutor threatened him”); John G. Browning, Keep Your “Friends” Close 
and Your Enemies Closer: Walking the Ethical Tightrope in the Use of Social Media, 3 ST. MARY’S J. ON LEGAL 
MAL. & ETHICS 204, 229 (2013) (discussing a San Diego County Bar Association’s ethics opinion 
which took the position that it is impermissible for a lawyer representing an allegedly wrongfully 
discharged employee to send a “friend request” to two high-ranking employees of a company that was 
known to be represented by counsel).  
18. See generally Ross Fischer & Jack Gullahorn, The Advent of State and Local Lobby Regulations and 
the Legal and Ethical Considerations for Attorneys, 3 ST. MARY’S J. ON LEGAL MAL. & ETHICS 32, 76 (2013) 
(noting the rule against communication with one represented by counsel “is ‘meant “to prevent lawyers 
from taking advantage of uncounselled lay persons and to preserve the integrity of the lawyer-client 
relationship.”’” (quoting Graham v. United States, 96 F.3d 446, 449 (9th Cir. 1996))). 
19. See Ethics of Communicating, supra note 15, at 520 (“One occasionally encounters arguments 
which tend to suggest that a purpose of the anti-contact rule is to protect interests of the attorney, 
rather than the interests of the client, the system, or the relationship.  The personal interests of the 
attorney might be reputational, such as where an attorney fears that he or she may be embarrassed 
because uncounselled statements made by a client may compromise the lawyer’s tactics.  Or the 
interests might be economic, where an uncounselled client, as the result of communications with 
opposing counsel, may discharge the attorney or settle for an inadequate amount, either of which may 
impair the attorney’s ability to earn a fee.” (footnote omitted) (citing 2 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & 
W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING: A HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL RULES OF 
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT § 4.2:102, at 731 (2d ed. Supp. 1998))). 
20. But see Vincent R. Johnson, Legal Malpractice in a Changing Profession: The Role of Contract 
Principles, 61 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 489, 510–11 (2013) [hereinafter Legal Malpractice in a Changing Profession] 
(“Although some of the rules of American legal ethics, such as the restrictions on lawyer advertising 
and solicitation, may have originated in a desire . . . to protect established lawyers from competition, 
the present regime contains few traces of that past.  The relevant provisions of modern legal ethics 
have been debated so vigorously, so often, and in so many fora during the past forty years that virtually 
every rule that has survived scrutiny and is currently in force can be justified on multiple legitimate 
grounds.” (footnotes omitted) (first citing JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND 
SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN AMERICA 42–48 (1976); then citing Michael S. Ariens, American Legal 
Ethics in an Age of Anxiety, 40 ST. MARY’S L.J. 343, 353–63 (2008); then citing Robert E. Lutz, An Essay 
Concerning the Changing International Legal Profession, 18 SW. J. INT’L L. 215, 219 (2011); and then citing 
Vincent R. Johnson, Justice Tom C. Clark’s Legacy in the Field of Legal Ethics, 29 J. LEGAL PROF. 33, 63 
(2005) [hereinafter Justice Tom C. Clark’s Legacy])). 
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person—can consent to communications that would otherwise violate the 
no-communication rule.21 
Against this backdrop which demonstrates that ethics rules sometimes 
have an unexpectedly broad or narrow reach, it is appropriate to consider 
the ethical obligations that are imposed on lawyers with respect to protecting 
the funds or property of third persons.  As articulated in the Model Rules 
of Professional Conduct,22 and the law of most states,23 the relevant 
 
21. See Pamela A. Bresnahan & Lucian T. Pera, The Impact of Technological Developments on the Rules 
of Attorney Ethics Regarding Attorney-Client Privilege, Confidentiality, and Social Media, 7 ST. MARY’S J. ON 
LEGAL MAL. & ETHICS 2, 21–22 (2016) (“Ethics opinions analyzing the prior consent provision of 
state analogs of Rule 4.2 have interpreted that provision strictly.  For example, the New York City Bar 
and North Carolina State Bar have each concluded that Rule 4.2 prohibits a lawyer from sending a 
‘reply all’ e-mail in response to an e-mail sent by opposing counsel, where opposing counsel copied his 
or her client on the original e-mail, unless opposing counsel has provided express or implied consent 
to do so.” (citing N.C. State Bar, Formal Op. 7 (2013); Ass’n of the Bar of the City of N.Y. Comm. on 
Prof’l & Judicial Ethics, Formal Op. 2009-01 (2009))); see also Marguerite Zoghby, The Prohibition of 
Communication with Adverse Parties in Civil Negotiations: Protecting Clients or Preventing Solutions?, 14 GEO. J. 
LEGAL ETHICS 1165, 1167 (2001) (“Courts and disciplinary authorities, such as state ethics boards, 
have interpreted Model Rule 4.2 literally, even prohibiting clients themselves from waiving the ban.” 
(citing Ethics of Communicating, supra note 15, at 502; Earnest F. Lidge, Government Civil Investigations and 
the Ethical Ban on Communicating with Represented Parties, 67 IND. L.J. 549, 553 n.15 (1992))). 
22. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.15 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017) (regarding the 
safekeeping of property). 
23. See, e.g., TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.14, reprinted in TEX. GOV’T 
CODE ANN., tit. 2, subtit. G, app. A (West 2016) (dealing with safekeeping of property and funds).  
The Texas rule provides: 
(a) A lawyer shall hold funds and other property belonging in whole or in part to clients or 
third persons that are in a lawyer’s possession in connection with a representation separate from 
the lawyer’s own property.  Such funds shall be kept in a separate account, designated as a “trust” 
or “escrow” account, maintained in the state where the lawyer’s office is situated, or elsewhere 
with the consent of the client or third person.  Other client property shall be identified as such 
and appropriately safeguarded.  Complete records of such account funds and other property shall 
be kept by the lawyer and shall be preserved for a period of five years after termination of the 
representation. 
(b) Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client or third person has an interest, a 
lawyer shall promptly notify the client or third person.  Except as stated in this rule or otherwise 
permitted by law or by agreement with the client, a lawyer shall promptly deliver to the client or 
third person any funds or other property that the client or third person is entitled to receive and, 
upon request by the client or third person, shall promptly render a full accounting regarding such 
property. 
(c) When in the course of representation a lawyer is in possession of funds or other property 
in which both the lawyer and another person claim interests, the property shall be kept separate 
by the lawyer until there is an accounting and severance of their interest.  All funds in a trust or 
escrow account shall be disbursed only to those persons entitled to receive them by virtue of the 
representation or by law.  If a dispute arises concerning their respective interests, the portion in 
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provisions seem to impose extensive obligations.  Those duties relate not 
only to safekeeping the assets in which the third person has an interest,24 
but to notification and delivery of the assets to the interested third person,25 
or sequestration of the assets in trust pending resolution of a dispute over 
who is entitled to receive the assets.26  However, as the following sections 
make clear, the obligations imposed by the relevant ethics rules are less 
extensive than they first appear. 
The rule on safekeeping of funds or property imposes only limited duties 
to protect the interests of third persons.  The limits on an attorney’s 
obligations to third parties reflect the fact that rules of legal ethics are 
animated by a complex matrix of goals and objectives.  Respect for the 
legitimate interests of third persons is important,27 but the law governing 
 
dispute shall be kept separated by the lawyer until the dispute is resolved, and the undisputed 
portion shall be distributed appropriately. 
Id. 
24. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.15(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017) (“A lawyer shall 
hold property of . . . third persons that is in a lawyer’s possession in connection with a representation 
separate from the lawyer’s own property.  Funds shall be kept in a separate account maintained in the 
state where the lawyer’s office is situated, or elsewhere with the consent of the . . . third person.  Other 
property shall be identified as such and appropriately safeguarded.  Complete records of such account 
funds and other property shall be kept by the lawyer and shall be preserved . . . .”). 
25. See id. r. 1.15(d) (“Upon receiving funds or other property in which a . . . third person has 
an interest, a lawyer shall promptly notify the . . . third person.  Except as stated in this rule or otherwise 
permitted by law or by agreement with the client, a lawyer shall promptly deliver to the . . . third person 
any funds or other property that the . . . third person is entitled to receive and, upon request by the . . . 
third person, shall promptly render a full accounting regarding such property.”). 
26. See id. r. 1.15(e) (“When in the course of representation a lawyer is in possession of property 
in which two or more persons (one of whom may be the lawyer) claim interests, the property shall be 
kept separate by the lawyer until the dispute is resolved.”); id. r. 1.15 cmt. 3 (“The disputed portion of 
the funds must be kept in a trust account . . . .”). 
27. See Robert P. Schuwerk, The Proposed New Safekeeping of Property Rule: Was It Worth All the 
Fuss?, ADVOCATE, Summer 2011, at 58, 58 (discussing a failed ethics reform).  Professor Schuwerk 
explained that the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct Committee: 
[W]as concerned . . . with numerous instances of lawyers apparently not realizing that the rule as 
written imposed ethical limits on how they treated third parties. . . .  [T]he Committee was given 
first-hand accounts of lawyers who had apparently believed it proper to do one or more of the 
following under the existing rule: (a) fail to notify third parties to whom the lawyer or client had 
made a binding promise of payment out of the client’s recovery or on whom the law conferred a 
right to payment out of that recovery, of the receipt of funds triggering that promise or the third 
party’s legal right; (b) make material misrepresentations to third parties as to the actual or 
proposed terms of a settlement of the client’s matter in order to get that third party to accept a 
lesser amount than that to which it was entitled; (c) withhold funds from the client’s recovery 
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lawyers also is “intended to (1) protect clients from unnecessary harm, 
(2) encourage legal resolution of disputes, (3) ensure client control of legal 
representation, (4) promote honesty and fairness in public and private 
affairs, and (5) assure the proper functioning of the justice system.”28 
II.    THE MODEL RULE ON SAFEKEEPING OF PROPERTY 
Any discussion of the duties of lawyers to protect the funds or property 
of third persons must undoubtedly begin with the text of Rule 1.15 of the 
American Bar Association’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct.  That 
provision has not only shaped state variations of the rule in many 
jurisdictions,29 but is widely taught in Professional Responsibility courses 
offered at American law schools,30 and tested on the Multistate Professional 
Responsibility Examination,31 the passage of which is required for 
admission to the bar in at least forty-six jurisdictions.32  With respect to 
duties to third persons, the relevant portions of Model Rule 1.15 provide: 
 
sufficient to pay third-party claims in full and then either (i) not pay them at all or (ii) resolve them 
for a lesser amount, with the lawyer pocketing the difference. 
Id. at 59. 
28. Legal Malpractice in a Changing Profession, supra note 20, at 512 (discussing the goals of legal 
ethics).   
29. See AM. BAR ASS’N CPR POLICY IMPLEMENTATION COMM., VARIATIONS OF  
THE ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (Dec. 12, 2016), 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/mrpc_
1_15.authcheckdam.pdf [perma.cc/Z52E-YVSQ] (noting variations from the terms of Model 
Rule 1.15).  Most of the variations are related to state implementation of IOLTA (Interest of Lawyer 
Trust Account) programs.  See, e.g., CONN. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.15 (2016) (containing 
numerous references to the handling of IOLTA accounts and non-IOLTA accounts). 
30. See Justice Tom C. Clark’s Legacy, supra note 20, at 56 (“At most law schools in the United 
States, students are now required to take a course devoted exclusively to the subject of attorney 
professional responsibility.” (citing Leslie C. Levin, The MPRE Reconsidered, 86 KY. L.J. 395, 407 n.49 
(1998))).  “These courses normally require law students to spend twenty or more classroom hours 
studying the types of ethical issues that attorneys confront in the practice of law.  Law school 
Professional Responsibility courses typically must be completed and passed in order for a student to 
graduate.”  Id. (footnote omitted) (citing Levin, supra, at 395). 
31. See id. at 58 (“The MPRE helps to ensure that what is taught in law school Professional 
Responsibility courses is focused and academically demanding.”). 
32. Multistate Professional Responsibility Exam, NAT’L CONF. B. EXAMINERS, 
http://ncbex.org/exams/mpre/ [perma.cc/NNH5-EYJWJ] (“The Multistate Professional 
Responsibility Examination (MPRE) is a two-hour, 60-question multiple-choice examination 
developed by [the] NCBE that is administered three times per year.  It is required for admission to the 
bars of all but three U.S. jurisdictions (Maryland, Wisconsin, and Puerto Rico).”).  “In addition, 
Connecticut and New Jersey accept successful completion of a law school course on professional 
responsibility in lieu of a passing score on the MPRE.”  Id. 
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Safekeeping Property 
(a) A lawyer shall hold property of clients or third persons that is in a lawyer’s 
possession in connection with a representation separate from the lawyer’s 
own property.  Funds shall be kept in a separate account maintained in the 
state where the lawyer’s office is situated, or elsewhere with the consent of the 
client or third person.  Other property shall be identified as such and 
appropriately safeguarded.  Complete records of such account funds and 
other property shall be kept by the lawyer and shall be preserved for a period 
of [five years] after termination of the representation. 
. . . . 
(d) Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client or third person has 
an interest, a lawyer shall promptly notify the client or third person.  Except as 
stated in this Rule or otherwise permitted by law or by agreement with the 
client, a lawyer shall promptly deliver to the client or third person any funds 
or other property that the client or third person is entitled to receive and, upon 
request by the client or third person, shall promptly render a full accounting 
regarding such property. 
(e) When in the course of representation a lawyer is in possession of property 
in which two or more persons (one of whom may be the lawyer) claim interests, the property 
shall be kept separate by the lawyer until the dispute is resolved.  The lawyer 
shall promptly distribute all portions of the property as to which the interests 
are not in dispute.33 
Only one part of the Comment to Mode Rule 1.15 refers to “third 
persons.”  The relevant commentary states: 
Paragraph (e) . . . recognizes that third parties may have lawful claims 
against specific funds or other property in a lawyer’s custody, such as a client’s 
creditor who has a lien on funds recovered in a personal injury action.  A 
lawyer may have a duty under applicable law to protect such third-party claims 
against wrongful interference by the client.  In such cases, when the 
third-party claim is not frivolous under applicable law, the lawyer must refuse 
to surrender the property to the client until the claims are resolved.  A lawyer 
should not unilaterally assume to arbitrate a dispute between the client and 
the third party, but, when there are substantial grounds for dispute as to the 
person entitled to the funds, the lawyer may file an action to have a court 
resolve the dispute.34 
 
33. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.15 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017) (emphasis added). 
34. Id. r. 1.15 cmt. 4. 
 68 ST. MARY’S JOURNAL ON LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS [Vol. 8:58 
A careful reading of Model Rule 1.15 quickly identifies the linguistic 
fault lines that run throughout the rule.  Subsection (a) refers to “property 
of . . . third persons.”35  In contrast, subsection (d) refers to “property in 
which a . . . third person has an interest[.]”36  Does the difference in 
language imply a difference in meaning?  Is there a distinction between 
owning property and merely having an interest in property?  Or are the two 
provisions talking about the same thing? 
More troublingly, subsection (e) talks about “property in which two or 
more persons . . . [merely] claim interests[.]”37  Surely, there is an important 
difference between owning property (subsection (a)), having an interest in 
property (subsection (d)), and simply claiming to have an interest in property 
(subsection (e)).  The language quoted above from the Comment to Model 
Rule 1.15 seems to limit the duties imposed on a lawyer with respect to 
claimed interests in property by requiring that the relevant funds or property 
must be “specific,” and that the claim must be “lawful” and “not 
frivolous.”38 
It is important to ask how far the duties of lawyers extend with respect to 
the protection of the funds or property claimed by third persons, for these 
types of issues arise in law offices every day and create serious dilemmas for 
attorneys.39  A review of relevant authorities strongly suggests that the 
protections afforded by state versions of Model Rule 1.15 may not extend 
as far as might first appear.  Such rules do not protect every person who 
asserts a claim to funds or property held by a lawyer in connection with the 
representation of a client.  As the following section demonstrates, current 
authorities draw an important distinction between matured legal or equitable 
interests and unmatured claims. 
  
 
35. Id. r. 1.15(a). 
36. Id. r. 1.15(d). 
37. Id. r. 1.15(e) (emphasis added). 
38. Id. r. 1.15 cmt. 4. 
39. Cf. Scott Morrill, Disbursing Disputed Funds: Understanding RPC 1.15-1(d)(e), OR. ST. B. BULL., 
Jan. 2011, at 9, 9 (“Difficulty with disputes between clients and third parties often arises when the 
lawyer tries to determine who is ‘entitled to receive’ the funds and whether the client and third party 
have legitimate claims to the funds.”); Ethics Advisory Serv. Comm., The Pitfalls of Rule 1.15(b), LA. B.J., 
Feb. 2001, at 392, 392 (“The vagaries of Rule of Professional Conduct 1.15(b), combined with the 
myriad of medical lien laws and growing consumer dissatisfaction with both lawyers and doctors, can 
lead to much discomfort and confusion about a lawyer’s obligation regarding client funds which may 
also be claimed by third parties, such as medical care providers.”). 
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III.    MATURED LEGAL OR EQUITABLE INTERESTS 
VERSUS UNMATURED CLAIMS 
A. Relevant Authority 
A well-reasoned ethics opinion of the Ohio Supreme Court’s Board of 
Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline sheds substantial light on the 
rule dealing with safekeeping of property.40  Interpreting the Ohio version 
of Model Rule 1.15, the Board wrote: 
A determinative issue for a lawyer is what constitutes an “interest” that 
triggers a lawyer’s safekeeping duties to a third person. 
The rule does not define “interest,” but Comment [4] to Rule 1.15 provides 
insight into the meaning of “interest” and the application of the rule.  “[T]hird 
parties may have lawful claims against specific funds or other property in a 
lawyer’s custody, such as a client’s creditor who has a lien on funds recovered 
in a personal injury action.  A lawyer may have a duty under applicable law to 
protect such third party-claims against a wrongful interference by the client.  
In such cases, when the third-party claim is not frivolous under applicable law, the 
lawyer must refuse to surrender the property to the client until the claims are 
resolved.” 
ABA Comment [4] to ABA Rule 1.15 is identical to Ohio’s Comment [4] 
to Rule 1.15.  Professors Hazard and Hodes state that use of the phrases 
“lawful claims” and “duty under applicable law” “suggest that the third party 
must have a matured legal or equitable claim, such as a lien on specific funds, 
in order to trigger the lawyer’s duty to hold the funds apart from either 
claimant, pending resolution of the dispute.” 
 . . . . 
Not every claim of a third person triggers a lawyer’s safekeeping duty, only a lawful claim 
that a lawyer knows of is an interest subject to protection under Rule 1.15. . . . 
What constitutes a lawful claim is a matter of substantive law.41 
It makes sense to distinguish between matured legal or equitable interests 
recognized by substantive law and mere claims that have never achieved 
 
40. Ohio Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline, Op. 2007-7 (2007). 
41. Id. at 3–4 (quoting 2 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF 
LAWYERING § 19.6 (3d ed. Supp. 2005)). 
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such legal status.  A lawyer has a duty to respect the property rights of 
others.42  However, a lawyer generally has no duty to advance the interests 
of a nonclient in acquiring property rights that the nonclient does not 
possess.43  As a Nevada ethics opinion cogently observed, the rule on 
safekeeping of property “does not create third party interests in funds; it just 
requires the attorney possessing the funds to honor the interests that the law 
recognizes.”44 
Numerous authorities have considered what constitutes a matured legal 
or equitable interest sufficient to oblige a lawyer to protect the interests of 
a third party in particular funds or property.  Those authorities suggest that 
the rights of a third person to funds or property in a lawyer’s possession is 
not easily established and generally requires something in the nature of: 
 
42. Cf. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2(d) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017) (“A lawyer shall 
not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or 
fraudulent . . . .”); id. r. 3.4 (dealing with fairness to opposing parties and counsel); id. r. 4.4(b) (“A 
lawyer who receives a document or electronically stored information relating to the representation of 
the lawyer’s client and knows or reasonably should know that the document or electronically stored 
information was inadvertently sent shall promptly notify the sender.”). 
43. A possible exception is the narrowly articulated, intended-third-party-beneficiary doctrine.  
For example:  
[A] lawyer owes a duty to use care . . .  
 . . . . 
 (3) to a nonclient when and to the extent that:  
 (a) the lawyer knows that a client intends as one of the primary objectives of the 
representation that the lawyer’s services benefit the nonclient;  
 (b) such a duty would not significantly impair the lawyer’s performance of obligations to the 
client; and  
 (c) the absence of such a duty would make enforcement of those obligations to the client 
unlikely . . . . 
1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 51 (AM. LAW INST. 2000); see also 
SUSAN SAAB FORTNEY & VINCENT R. JOHNSON, LEGAL MALPRACTICE LAW: PROBLEMS AND 
PREVENTION 221–28 (2d ed. 2015) (discussing cases). 
44. Nev. Standing Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 31, at 3 (2005) 
(citing Silver v. Statewide Grievance Comm., 679 A.2d 392 (Conn. App. Ct. 1996), appeal dismissed, 
699 A.2d 151 (Conn. 1997) (per curiam)). 
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• a valid statutory lien,45 judgment lien,46 or similar court order;47 
• a court judgment concerning disposition of property48 or funds in the 
lawyer’s possession;49 
• statutory subrogation rights;50 
• a secured claim by a creditor that is specific to the funds in the lawyer’s 
possession;51 
 
45. See D.C. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Informal Op. 293 (2000) (“In 
general, a ‘just claim’ that the lawyer must honor pursuant to Rule 1.15 is one that relates to the 
particular funds in the lawyer’s possession, as opposed to merely being (or alleged to be) a general 
unsecured obligation of the client[,] . . .  [Such as] a statutory lien that applies to the proceeds of the 
suit being handled by the lawyer[.]” (citations omitted)); see also Aetna Cas. Co. v. Gilreath, 625 S.W.2d 
269, 274 (Tenn. 1981) (holding the lawyer was under a duty to recognize the statutory lien of the client’s 
employer on workers’ compensation recovery proceeds); Colo. Bar Ass’n Ethics Comm’n, Formal 
Op. 94, at 4-257 (1993) (“Where the third party holds an undisputed interest as a result of a statutory 
lien . . . the property should be distributed in accordance with the terms of the lien . . . .”); D.C. Bar 
Ass’n Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Informal Op. 251 (1994) (discussing how a lawyer 
must disregard a client’s direction to disburse settlement proceeds to the client in face of the statutory 
Medicaid lien); Ill. State Bar Ass’n, Informal Op. 01-04 (2002) (“Assuming that a valid lien exists, an 
attorney becomes liable for tortious conversion when: (1) the lienholder has a right to the property; 
(2) he has the right to immediate and absolute possession; (3) he has made a demand; and (4) the 
attorney wrongfully took possession or control of the property.” (citing Cirrincione v. Johnson, 
561 N.E.2d 662, 666 (Ill. 1990))). 
46. See Ohio Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline, Op. 2007-7, at 6 (2007) (explaining 
the exception “to the principle that a lawyer has a constitutional obligation to deliver property of the 
client to the client, on demand, despite third-party claims . . . [if] the lawyer knows of a valid statutory 
or judgment lien against the property”). 
47. See McIntyre v. Comm’n for Lawyer Discipline, 247 S.W.3d 434, 437 (Tex. App.—
Dallas 2008, no pet.) (involving a judicial order to an attorney to deliver a check to the IRS); D.C. Bar 
Ass’n Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Informal Op. 293 (2000) (“[A]n attachment or 
garnishment arising out of a money judgment against the client (or ordered judicially prior to judgment) 
and duly served upon the lawyer . . . .”); Nev. Standing Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, 
Formal Op. 31, at 4 (2005) (discussing “attachment or garnishment upon the specific funds”). 
48. See Ohio Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline, Op. 2007-7, at 4 (2007) (“A lawful 
claim includes a valid judgment lien . . . .”). 
49. D.C. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Informal Op. 293 (2000) (“[A] 
court order relating to the specific funds in the lawyer’s possession . . . .” (citations omitted) (citing 
Colo. Bar Ass’n Ethics Comm’n Formal Op. 94 (Nov. 20, 1993))); Ohio Bd. of Comm’rs on 
Grievances & Discipline, Op. 2007-7, at 4 (2007) (“A lawful claim includes . . . [an] order of a court 
regarding the specific funds in the lawyer’s possession.”). 
50. See Ohio Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline, Op. 2007-7, at 4 (2007) (“A lawful 
claim includes a valid statutory subrogation right as to the specific funds in the lawyer’s possession.”). 
51. See id. at 5 (“A lawful claim includes a secured claim by a creditor that is specific to the funds 
in a lawyer’s possession.  It is not a lawyer’s responsibility to pay general unsecured creditors of a client, 
including judgment creditors who have not attached or garnisheed the funds.”); Or. State Bar Bd. of 
Governors, Formal Op. 2005-52 (2005) (“As a matter of law, Secured Creditor’s valid and perfected 
security interest entitles Secured Creditor to receive funds to the extent necessary to satisfy the security 
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• a valid assignment;52  
• “a contractual agreement made by the client and joined in or ratified by 
the lawyer to pay certain funds in the possession of the lawyer (e.g., client 
expenses in consideration of the supplier’s agreement to forebear 
collection action during the pendency of the lawsuit) to a third party[;]”53 
or 
 
interest. . . .  The same would be true if Secured Creditor’s lien were statutory rather than contractual 
in origin.”). 
52. See Bonanza Motors, Inc. v. Webb, 657 P.2d 1102, 1105 (Idaho Ct. App. 1983) (finding that 
the state’s ethics rule did “not shield the law firm from responsibility for failing to transmit the assigned 
funds to the creditor-assignee” because “[t]he client had dealt with those funds by a valid and 
enforceable assignment” and “was not ‘entitled to receive’ the funds assigned”); Berkowitz v. Haigood, 
606 A.2d 1157, 1160 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1992) (“Since the client has the power to validly assign 
the proceeds, the attorney has the obligation to honor such an assignment, if properly notified.”); 
Romero v. Earl, 810 P.2d 808, 810 (N.M. 1991) (“[O]nce an attorney has accepted from his client an 
assignment of settlement proceeds to the client’s creditor, the client, as assignor, cannot cancel or 
modify the assignment by unilateral action without the assent of the assignee, nor may he defeat the 
rights of the assignee.  Under such circumstances, a lawyer is not ethically bound to give the client 
more than the sum to which the client is entitled, nor is the client entitled to receive the funds promised 
to the creditor.” (citing Martinez v. Martinez, 650 P.2d 819, 822 (N.M. 1982); Bonanza Motors, 657 P.2d 
at 1104)); Hsu v. Parker, 688 N.E.2d 1099, 1102 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996) (“After notice of the assignment 
has been given to the obligor, or knowledge thereof received by him in any manner, the assignor has 
no remaining power of release.  The obligor must pay the assignee.” (quoting 4 ARTHUR LINTON 
CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 890 (1951))); Butler v. Comm’n for Lawyer Discipline, 
928 S.W.2d 659, 663 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1996, no pet.) (involving an apparently valid 
assignment that was declared void as a matter of law); Winship v. Gem City Bone & Joint, P.C., 
185 P.3d 1252, 1257 (Wyo. 2008) (“[P]ayment of the settlement proceeds to a client’s valid assignee 
does not violate an attorney’s ethical obligations.”); see also Silver v. Statewide Grievance Comm., 
699 A.2d 151, 196 (Conn. 1997) (per curiam) (“If there was, for example, a valid assignment by the 
client of an interest in the settlement proceeds, then that, of course, would be binding on the lawyer 
and it would be unethical for the lawyer to ignore it once it has been brought to his attention.” (citing 
Bonanza Motors, 657 P.2d 1102; Berkowitz, 606 A.2d 1157; Leon v. Martinez, 638 N.E.2d 511 (1994))); 
Cal. Standing Comm’n on Prof’l Responsibility & Conduct, Formal Op. 1988-101 (“[S]hould the 
attorney pay the funds to the client, it may be found that the attorney did so in degradation of an 
enforceable third party lien exposing the attorney to potential civil liability to the health care 
provider.”);  Nev. Standing Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 31, at 3 (2005) 
(citing Achrem v. Expressway Plaza Ltd., 917 P.2d 447 (1996) (per curiam)) (“The most clear-cut 
example of when the law will recognize an interest in funds is when the third party receives a common 
law assignment of such funds.”). 
53. D.C. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Informal Op. 293 (2000); see Fla. 
Bar v. Neely, 587 So. 2d 465, 466, 468 (Fla. 1991) (per curiam) (disbarring an attorney based in part on 
his failure to perform a promise to pay a doctor out of the lawsuit recovery for continuing to treat the 
attorney’s client); Nev. Standing Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 31, at 4 (2005) 
(discussing the term “letter of protection”); Tex. Prof’l Ethics Comm., Op. 625 (2013) (“It is a violation 
of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct for a lawyer who replaces a client’s prior 
lawyer in a litigation matter to distribute funds resulting from settlement of the litigation matter without 
regard to a promise of payment, of which the second lawyer is aware, given to the client’s healthcare 
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• ownership of the disputed funds.54 
To summarize, the term “matured legal or equitable interest” denotes the 
narrow range of cases in which authorities have found that claims trigger 
the protections of the ethics rules dealing with safekeeping of property.  
Those cases traditionally have involved the assertion of rights acquired by 
assignment, lien, court order, judgment, statute, or letter of protection—and 
no others.   
In contrast, one reported decision noted, “Examples of unmatured legal 
or equitable claims are: medical bills from the client without a provider 
demand; unsigned, unrecorded medical liens; medical bills or a demand 
letter from a provider to an attorney; or knowledge that the provider treated 
the client for accident related injuries.”55  Apparently coined by professors 
Geoffrey C. Hazard and W. William Hodes, the authors of a leading treatise 
on the law of attorney professional responsibility,56 the term “matured legal 
 
provider in a letter signed by the client’s prior lawyer.”); see also Am. State Bank v. Enabnit, 471 N.W.2d 
829, 833 (Iowa 1991) (“Although the clients were bound under their contract to pay the funds to the 
bank, [lawyer] Enabnit was not.  When, for reasons of their own, the clients demanded the funds, 
Enabnit did not become liable to the bank for complying with the demand.”).  Additionally, the court, 
deciding Heffelfinger v. Gibson, wrote:  
Appellant argues that he was not liable to appellee under the agreement because he had turned 
Mrs. Strassburger’s case over to another attorney, Davis, and none of the funds paid to her in the 
settlement of her lawsuit ever passed through his hands.  That circumstance is not enough to 
relieve him of his obligation.  In clear language, he had specifically agreed, “to withhold such sums 
from any settlement, judgment or verdict as may be necessary to adequately protect the said doctor 
above-named.”  For appellant to have avoided liability under this agreement would, in our view, 
have required a novation . . . . 
Heffelfinger v. Gibson, 290 A.2d 390, 393 (D.C. 1972) (citing 1 RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 165 
(AM. LAW INST. 1932)). 
54. See Clements v. Comm’n for Lawyer Discipline, No. 01-99-00258-CV, 1999 WL 1063451, 
at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Nov. 24, 1999, no pet.) (“When Clements disbursed the 
[proceeds of Bell’s $10,000 check] to his clients, no settlement agreement had been signed by Bell.  
Thus, the funds still belonged to Bell.  Consequently, Clements was, as a matter of law, obligated under 
Rule 1.14(a) to keep the funds in his trust account until Bell signed the settlement agreement.”). 
55. Haro v. Sebelius, 789 F. Supp. 2d 1179, 1194 (D. Ariz. 2011) (citing Ariz. Comm’n on Rules 
of Prof’l Conduct, Informal Op. 98-06 (1998)) (“The Rules of Professional Conduct provide that the 
lawyer has an ethical duty to protect third-party claims and to refuse to surrender property to a client 
when the third-party claim has become a matured legal or equitable claim.” (citing ARIZ. RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.15 (2014))), rev’d on other grounds 747 F.3d 1099 (9th Cir. 2014). 
56. GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING (3d ed. 
2001); see, e.g., 1 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., ET AL., THE LAW OF LAWYERING § 20.06, at 20-16 
(4th ed. Supp. 2016) (“Comment [4] to Rule 1.15 uses the phrases ‘lawful claims’ and ‘duty under 
applicable law’ to suggest that the third party must have a matured legal or equitable claim . . . in order 
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or equitable claim” has been widely used in cases,57 articles,58 ethics 
opinions,59 appellate briefs,60 and trial court documents.61 
B. State Variations 
Some jurisdictions have drafted their own versions of the ethics rule 
dealing with safekeeping of property in ways that specifically address the 
difference between matured legal or equitable interests, on the one hand, 
versus unmatured claims, on the other hand.  For example, Rule 1.15 of the 
Ohio Rules of Professional Conduct now provides: 
(d) Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client or third person 
has a lawful interest, a lawyer shall promptly notify the client or third person.  
 
to trigger the lawyer’s duty to hold the funds apart from either claimant, pending the resolution of the 
dispute.”). 
57. See Crane v. Native Am. Air Ambulance, Inc., No. CV 06-092 TUC FRZ (HCE), 2007 WL 
625917, at *11 (D. Ariz. Feb. 23, 2007) (quoting ARIZ. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.15 cmt. 4 
(2007)) (“[W]hen the third-party claim has become a matured legal or equitable claim, the lawyer must 
refuse to surrender the property to the client . . . .”); Silver, 699 A.2d at 155 (“An interest as used in the 
rules means more than an unsecured claim with respect to a third party.  An interest in the fund or 
property requires that the third party have a matured legal or equitable lien.” (citing 1 GEOFFREY C. 
HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING: A HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL 
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT § 1.15:302, at 460 (2d ed. 1996))). 
58. See Geoff Trachtenberg & Patricia Sallen, New Tool Addresses Third-Party Claims to Legal Funds, 
ARIZ. ATT’Y., Jan. 2014, at 30, 30 (“To comply with your client’s direction [to hand over the money] . . . 
you would have to conclude that the putative creditor doesn’t have a ‘matured legal or equitable 
claim.’”); Proposed Advisory Opinion 02-05, 29 FLA. B. NEWS, no. 2, 2002, at 11 (discussing the term in 
examining out-of-state precedent). 
59. See Ariz. Comm. on Rules of Prof’l Conduct, Informal Op. 98-06 (1998) (“The Committee 
concludes that an attorney must have actual knowledge of a ‘matured legal or equitable claim’ to all or 
part of the funds or other property held by the attorney in order for the special duties of ER 1.15(b) 
to be invoked.”); Utah Ethics Advisory Op. Comm., Formal Op. No. 00-04 (2000) (“When a lawyer 
receives funds or property and knows a third person claims an interest in the funds or property, the 
lawyer must first determine whether the third person has a sufficient interest to trigger the duties stated 
in Rule 1.15(b).  Only a matured legal or equitable claim—such as a valid assignment, a judgment lien, 
or a statutory lien—constitutes an interest within the meaning of Rule 1.15 . . . .  If no such interest 
exists, the lawyer may disburse the funds or property to the client.”). 
60. See, e.g., Brief of Respondent at 24, United Fin. Cas. Co. v. Coleman, 295 P.3d 763 
(Wash. Ct. App. 2012) (No. 42276-o-11), 2011 WL 8183089 (“Once such a statutory lien has been 
recorded with the County Recorder, the attorney would be deemed to have notice of the lien, and the 
lien would represent a ‘matured legal or equitable claim’ under [ethics rule] 1.15.”). 
61. See, e.g., Defendants Jay H. Solowsky and Pertnoy, Solowsky & Allen, P.A.’s Reply 
Memorandum in Support of Their Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Verified Complaint and Jury Demand 
at 3 n.2, Bocciolone v. Solowsky, No. 08-20200-CIV-COOKE/BANDSTRA, 2009 WL 10666926 
(S.D. Fla. 2009) (No. 08-202000-CIV-COOKE/DUBÉ), 2008 WL 2934840 (referencing the Hazard 
and Hodes treatise, which it describes as a “leading authority”). 
 2017] Limited Duties of Lawyers to Protect Funds and Property of Nonclients 75 
For purposes of this rule, the third person’s interest shall be one of which the lawyer has 
actual knowledge and shall be limited to a statutory lien, a final judgment addressing 
disposition of the funds or property, or a written agreement by the client or the lawyer on 
behalf of the client guaranteeing payment from the specific funds or property.  Except as 
stated in this rule or otherwise permitted by law or by agreement with the 
client or a third person, confirmed in writing, a lawyer shall promptly deliver to 
the client or third person any funds or other property that the client or third 
person is entitled to receive.  Upon request by the client or third person, the 
lawyer shall promptly render a full accounting regarding such funds or other 
property.62 
In Cincinnati Bar Association v. Alsfelder,63 the Supreme Court of Ohio held 
that, under Ohio’s version of Model Rule 1.15, the rights of a third person 
to an accounting did not extend to that jurisdiction’s lawyer disciplinary 
authority, but was instead limited to a third person who has a lawful interest 
in funds or other property in the lawyer’s possession.  As the court 
explained: 
The third person discussed throughout Prof. Cond. R. 1.15(d) is not any 
third person, but the third person who has a lawful interest in funds or other 
property in the lawyer’s possession.  To interpret the rule otherwise would 
permit any third person to request—and be entitled to receive—an account 
of funds or property held by a lawyer.  Here, the facts that . . . [the state lawyer 
disciplinary authority] subpoenaed [attorney] Alsfelder’s account records and 
that Alsfelder failed to comply are simply not relevant in the context of an 
alleged violation of [Rule] 1.15(d).64 
Alabama has adopted a version of the safekeeping rule that limits a 
lawyer’s duties to third persons.  Those obligations exist only where the 
“third person has an interest from a source other than the client or the third 
person.”65 
In Arizona, the duties of a lawyer to hold disputed property in trust 
pending resolution of a dispute may be limited by the actions of the persons 
involved.  If the lawyer provides notice to the third person of intent to 
 
62. OHIO RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.15 (2015) (first and second emphasis added). 
63. Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Alsfelder, 6 N.E.3d 1162 (Ohio 2014). 
64. Id. at 1166 (first emphasis added). 
65. ALA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.15(b) (2016) (emphasis added).  “Upon receiving 
funds or other property in which a client or third person has an interest from a source other than the 
client or the third person, a lawyer shall promptly notify the client or third person.”  Id. 
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distribute the property to the lawyer’s client, and the third person fails to 
initiate legal action within ninety days to assert a claim to said property, and 
provide notice thereof, the lawyer may make the distribution after 
consultation with the client, unless prohibited from doing so by law or court 
order.66  Thus, Arizona’s version of the safekeeping of property rule makes 
clear that, at least in some situations, the third person must do far more than 
merely notify the lawyer of a claim, but in fact must initiate legal proceedings 
aimed at protecting the third person’s legal interests. 
The Connecticut rule67 on safekeeping of property makes certain that 
not all claims by third persons are sufficient to impede the distribution of 
property by a lawyer to the client, and creates a mechanism to assist lawyers 
in resolving uncertainty about the legitimacy of interests claimed by third 
persons.  Connecticut Rule 1.15 provides: 
 
66. ARIZ. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.15(f) (2015).  The Arizona rule provides: 
Where the competing claims are between a client and a third party, the lawyer may provide 
written notice to the third party of the lawyer’s intent to distribute the property to the client, as 
follows:  
(1) The notice shall be served on the third party in the manner provided under Rules 4.1 or 
4.2 of the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure, and must inform the third party that the lawyer may 
distribute the property to the client unless the third party initiates legal action and provides the 
lawyer with written notice of such action within 90 calendar days of the date of service of the 
lawyer’s notice.   
(2) If the lawyer does not receive such written notice from the third party within the 90-day 
period, and provided that the disbursement is not prohibited by law or court order, the lawyer 
may distribute the funds to the client after consulting with the client regarding the advantages and 
disadvantages of disbursement of the disputed funds and obtaining the client’s informed consent 
to the distribution, confirmed in writing.   
(3) If the lawyer is notified in writing of an action filed within the 90-day period, the lawyer 
shall continue to hold the property separate unless and until the parties reach an agreement on 
distribution of the property, or a court resolves the matter.   
(4) Nothing in this rule is intended to alter a third party’s substantive rights. 
Id. 
67. CONN. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.15(g) (2016). 
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(g) The word “interest(s)” as used in this subsection and subsections (e)68 
and (f)69 means more than the mere assertion of a claim by a third party.  In the event 
a lawyer is notified by a third party or a third party’s agent of a claim to funds 
held by the lawyer on behalf of a client, but it is unclear to the lawyer whether 
the third party has a valid interest within the meaning of this Rule, the lawyer 
may make a written request that the third party or third party’s agent provide 
the lawyer such reasonable information and/or documentation as needed to 
assist the lawyer in determining whether substantial grounds exist for the third 
party’s claim to the funds.  If the third party or third party’s agent fails to 
comply with such a request within sixty days, the lawyer may distribute the 
funds in question to the client.70 
The Louisiana version of Model Rule 1.15 tightly defines the types of 
property interests that trigger the obligations of the safekeeping of property 
rule.  Louisiana Rule 1.15(d) states: 
Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client or third person 
has an interest, a lawyer shall promptly notify the client or third person.  For 
purposes of this rule, the third person’s interest shall be one of which the lawyer has actual 
knowledge, and shall be limited to a statutory lien or privilege, a final judgment addressing 
disposition of those funds or property, or a written agreement by the client or the lawyer on 
behalf of the client guaranteeing payment out of those funds or property.71   
 
68. Subsection (e) of the Connecticut rule provides: 
Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client or third person has an interest, a 
lawyer shall promptly notify the client or third person.  Except as stated in this Rule or otherwise 
permitted by law or by agreement with the client or third person, a lawyer shall promptly deliver 
to the client or third person any funds or other property that the client or third person is entitled 
to receive and, upon request by the client or third person, shall promptly render a full accounting 
regarding such property. 
Id. r. 1.15(e).   
69. Subsection (f) of the Connecticut rule provides: 
When in the course of representation a lawyer is in possession of property in which two or 
more persons (one of whom may be the lawyer) have interests, the property shall be kept separate 
by the lawyer until any competing interests are resolved.  The lawyer shall promptly distribute all 
portions of the property as to which the lawyer is able to identify the parties that have interests 
and as to which there are no competing interests.  Where there are competing interests in the 
property or a portion of the property, the lawyer shall segregate and safeguard the property subject 
to the competing interests. 
Id. r. 1.15(f). 
70. Id. r. 1.15(g) (emphasis added).   
71. LA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.15(d) (2016) (emphasis added). 
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The Wisconsin rule on safekeeping of property likewise makes clear that 
a lawyer is required to act to protect third persons from harm only in regards 
to a tightly defined range of property interests.  Wisconsin Supreme Court 
Rule 20:1.15(e) states: 
(1) . . . .  Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client has an 
interest, or in which a lawyer has received notice that a 3rd party has an interest 
identified by a lien, court order, judgment, or contract, the lawyer shall promptly notify 
the client or 3rd party in writing. 
. . . . 
(3) . . . .  When a lawyer and another person or a client and another person 
claim an ownership interest in trust property identified by a lien, court order, judgment, or 
contract, the lawyer shall hold that property in trust until there is an accounting 
and severance of the interests.72 
C. Unsecured Creditors Are Not Protected 
Numerous authorities have emphasized that unsecured creditors are not 
protected by legal ethics rules dealing with the safekeeping of property.73  
For example, the Nevada ethics committee wrote, “the mere assertion of a 
‘claim’ by a general, unsecured creditor is not an ‘interest’ in the funds 
themselves in the hands of the lawyer.”74  The District of Columbia ethics 
committee explained that, “a lawyer is not required to pay the general 
unsecured creditors of her client, including judgment creditors who have 
not attached or garnished the funds in the lawyer’s possession[.]”75  
Consequently, “the mere assertion of a claim by a third party is not enough 
 
72. WIS. SUP. CT. r. 20:1.15 (2016) (emphasis added). 
73. See Klancke v. Smith, 829 P.2d 464, 466 (Colo. App. 1991) (“Although we agree that the 
children are entitled to a portion of the [wrongful death] award, we conclude that defendant [lawyer] 
Smith satisfied his statutory duty by paying the settlement proceeds to his client, the surviving party 
entitled to sue and recover damages.” (citing Campbell v. Shankle, 680 P.2d 1352 (Colo. App. 1984))); 
Blue Cross of Mass. v. Travaline, 499 N.E.2d 1195, 1199–1200 (Mass. 1986) (concluding personal 
injury lawyer owed no duty to pay settlement proceeds to insurers, whose master medical certificate 
contained a subrogation clause); HAZARD, JR. & HODES, supra note 11, at §19.6 (explaining that a third 
party’s claim that is not reduced to a judgment against a lawyer’s client does not warrant a lawyer’s 
refusal to deliver funds to his client); see also Schuwerk, supra note 27, at 58 (“[W]hat have always been 
considered to be excluded . . . are general creditors of the client with no claim to the particular funds in 
the lawyer’s possession.”). 
74. Nev. Standing Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 31, at 3 (2005). 
75. D.C. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 293 (2000). 
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by itself to freeze property in the lawyer’s possession until the dispute is 
resolved.”76   
In their nationally used textbook, Professors Lisa G. Lerman and Philip 
G. Schrag, who teach at Catholic University and Georgetown respectively, 
explain: 
A lawyer is not a collection agency for all his clients’ creditors.  [A] department 
store has no right to ask the lawyer to give it money that the client owes, even 
if the debt is legitimate and overdue.  If, on the other hand, the department 
store sues the client for the money, obtains a judgment, and then obtains an 
order against the lawyer to surrender the funds, that is another matter.77 
Section 45 of the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers, which was 
enacted long after Texas and other states had revised their ethics rules to 
impose on lawyers a limited range of obligations relating to the safekeeping 
of the funds and property of third persons, makes clear that unsecured 
creditors are not protected.78  According to the Restatement: 
 
76. Id. (“Indeed, the imposition of such a requirement [to freeze assets based on mere assertion 
of a claim] . . . could raise significant due process issues as constituting, in effect, a prejudgment 
attachment.” (citing Conn. Office of State Ethics, Informal Op. 95-20 (1995); Sniadach v. Family Fin. 
Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); N. Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, 
Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975))). 
77. LISA G. LERMAN & PHILIP G. SCHRAG, ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN THE PRACTICE OF 
LAW 550 (2d ed. 2008). 
78. For example, when the 1971 Texas Code of Professional Responsibility was replaced by the 
current Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct, effective January 1, 1990, the rule dealing 
with the safekeeping of funds and property of clients was expanded to impose on lawyers certain 
limited obligations to third persons.  Robert P. Schuwerk & John F. Sutton, Jr., A Guide to the Texas 
Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct, 27A HOUS. L. REV., no. 5, 1990, at 15, 16.  During the same 
period of time, similar changes were made to the ethics rules of other states dealing with the safekeeping 
of property.  See Jeanne M. Whalen, Comment, Safekeeping Client Property: Why the ABA Is Hands-Off and 
the States Are Hand-Holding, 38 U. TOL. L. REV. 1279, 1294 n.80 (2007) (“[Promulgated in 1983], Rule 
1.15 [of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct] extended fiduciary protection to third parties 
as well as those who had established an attorney-client relationship with the lawyer in question.” (citing 
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.15(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017))).  The developments in other 
jurisdictions dealing with the interests of third parties sometimes used language identical to the 
language found in the Texas Rules.  The president of the State Bar of Texas explained to the Texas 
lawyers who voted in the referendum that, “In drafting the . . . [Texas] Disciplinary Rules, the [Texas] 
committee relied not only on the American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct 
[(1983)] but, to an equal degree, relied on the codes and rules of the bar associations of our sister 
states . . . .”  James B. Sales, The Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct: A Model to Replace the 
Outdated Texas Code of Professional Responsibility, 52 TEX. B.J. 388, 390 (1989); see also W. Frank Newton, 
The Proposed Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct Should Be Adopted, 52 TEX. B.J. 557, 557 (1989) 
(relating “work product of state and national legal leaders”). 
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If a lawyer holds property belonging to one person and a second person has 
a contractual or similar claim against that person but does not claim to own 
the property or have a security interest on it, the lawyer is free to deliver the 
property to the person to whom it belongs.79 
Thus, a mere contractual promise that has not been adjudicated by a 
court, or the simple possibility that a third party might assert rights under 
common law or statutory principles that are not self-executing, is not 
sufficient to trigger the protections of ethics rules dealing with the 
safekeeping of funds and/or property. 
Distinguishing between claims of a matured legal or equitable interest and 
unsecured claims draws a sensible line in regard to respect for property 
rights.  Lawyers and clients must respect the property rights of others.  The 
difficulty arises when there is uncertainty as to the existence or validity of a 
claim.  When a person claims to have a matured property interest acquired 
by way of assignment, lien, court order, judgment, statute, or letter of 
protection, it is typically easy to resolve the matter by reference to 
documentary evidence.  Consequently, in such situations, sequestration of 
the disputed funds or property is likely to be minimally disruptive to the 
interests of the lawyer’s client.  In contrast, unsecured claims come in all 
varieties, are often not easily resolved, and are hence disruptive and subject 
to abuse.  The distinction between claims of matured legal or equitable 
interests and unsecured claims articulates a workable rule for balancing 
clients’ interests and the property rights of others. 
D. Unknown Claims 
The ethical duties imposed on a lawyer to protect the property interests 
of third persons only extends to lawful, matured claims of interest which are 
known to the lawyer.  A lawyer does not have a duty to search out 
information about claims which are unknown.  Such an obligation might be 
regarded as both burdensome and vague.80  In addition, a Texas ethics 
opinion explained: 
 
79. 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 45 cmt. d (AM. LAW 
INST. 2000). 
80. See Jim M. Perdue, Jr., Duties to People You Don’t Know, Will Never Meet, and Who Hate Your 
Client: The Objections to Proposed Amendments to Texas Disciplinary Rule of Professional Conduct 1.15, 
ADVOCATE, Summer 2011, at 62, 64 (discussing a proposed change to ethics rules under which “the 
threat of failing to provide notice to [nonclients] about property to which the attorney’s client is entitled 
appeared to be elevated to a grievable offense”).  
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[A lawyer’s] obligations with respect to clients’ confidential information do 
not permit a lawyer to make inquiries as to the existence of unasserted claims 
to funds otherwise belonging to the client.  No requirement for such inquiries 
is imposed by the Texas Disciplinary Rules.  Moreover, the Committee is 
aware of no provision of state or federal law that would require inquiries in 
these circumstances.81 
Various authorities have also reached the conclusion that a lawyer has no 
duty to notify a third party that funds are being received if that party has no 
existing, matured and legally enforceable interest in that property.82  For 
example, in Silver v. Statewide Grievance Committee,83 a grievance committee 
reprimanded a lawyer for failing to notify automobile insurers of the receipt 
of settlement funds and failing to sequester those funds until the pending 
claims of the client and insurers were resolved.84  The Appellate Court of 
Connecticut subsequently affirmed a judgment holding that the lawyer was 
not required to notify insurers of receipt of settlement proceeds or to pay 
any portion of settlement proceeds to them because, under a state law, the 
insurers did not acquire a statutory lien on the claimant’s recovery until such 
time as the proceeds of such recovery were in the possession and control of 
the claimant.85  In other words, the statutory right to a lien had not yet 
matured at the time the funds were still in the control of the lawyer.  As the 
court explained: 
Rule 1.15 does not create third party interests, but, rather, requires an 
attorney to safeguard only those interests that otherwise exist at law. . . .  [T]he 
legislature insulated attorneys from the liability of reimbursing basic 
reparations benefits by providing that an insurer’s lien does not attach to a 
 
81. Tex. Prof’l Ethics Comm., Op. 606 (2011). 
82. See, e.g., 48 ROBERT P. SCHUWERK & LILLIAN B. HARDWICK, HANDBOOK OF TEXAS 
LAWYER AND JUDICIAL ETHICS: ATTORNEY TORT STANDARDS, ATTORNEY ETHICS STANDARDS, 
JUDICIAL ETHICS STANDARDS, RECUSAL AND DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES § 6:14, at 1237 (2017) 
(“[A]bsent an obligation imposed by law or contract, a lawyer has no obligation to seek out and notify 
creditors of the lawyer’s client of the receipt of funds belonging in whole or in part to the client.”); see 
also D.C. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 293 (2000) (“[T]he rule does 
not apply to claims of which the lawyer lacks knowledge.” (citing Shapiro v. McNeill, 699 N.E.2d 407, 
409 (1998))); Ohio Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline, Op. 2007-7, at 1 (2007) (“Not every 
claim of a third person triggers a lawyer’s safekeeping duty, only a lawful claim that a lawyer knows of is an interest 
subject to protection under Rule 1.15.”). 
83. Silver v. Statewide Grievance Comm., 679 A.2d 392 (Conn. App. Ct. 1996), appeal dismissed, 
699 A.2d 151 (Conn. 1997) (per curiam). 
84. Id. at 396. 
85. Id. at 396–97. 
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claimant’s recovery until the claimant has possession and is in control of the 
recovery.  While settlement proceeds were in the plaintiff’s [lawyer’s] control, 
therefore, Safeco and USAA did not have an interest in the proceeds.  Their 
interests in the Jones and La Banca cases arose only after the plaintiff had 
distributed the proceeds to his clients.  We conclude that the plaintiff did not 
have an ethical duty to notify the insurance companies of his receipt of the 
settlement proceeds or to deliver a portion of the proceeds to the insurance 
companies.86 
A Nevada ethics committee likewise stated that “the lawyer who receives 
funds has no ethical duty to affirmatively seek to discover third parties with 
an interest in the funds before paying them out.”87  Citing a Utah ethics 
opinion, the Nevada committee wrote, “the lawyer’s knowledge that his 
client owes bills—even if the lawyer knows that a creditor (without a 
promise by the client or lawyer) expects payment [out] of the personal injury 
recovery—does not give rise to an ‘interest’ in the funds by the creditor.”88 
E. Liability to Persons Not in Privity 
It is a basic principle of the law governing lawyers that broad-ranging 
duties are owed to clients, while only limited duties are owed to 
nonclients.89  The concept of privity remains an important benchmark in 
the law of legal malpractice for two reasons: “First, absent a requirement of 
privity, parties to a contract for legal services could easily lose control over 
their agreement.  Second, imposing a duty to the general public upon lawyers 
would expose lawyers to a virtually unlimited potential for liability.”90 
Courts have been very reluctant to impose duties on lawyers that may 
conflict with the duties they owe to their clients.91  Interpreting the 
 
86. Id. at 397 (emphasis added). 
87. Nev. Standing Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 31, at 5 (2005). 
88. Id. (citing Utah Ethics Advisory Op. Comm., Formal Op. No. 00-04 (2000)). 
89. See generally VINCENT R. JOHNSON, LEGAL MALPRACTICE LAW IN A NUTSHELL 169–256 
(2d ed. 2016) (discussing limited duties owed to nonclients, but identifying seventeen theories under 
which courts have imposed liability). 
90. Calvert v. Sharf, 619 S.E.2d 197, 203 (W. Va. 2005) (quoting Schreiner v. Scoville, 
410 N.W.2d 679, 681 (Iowa 1987)); see also Blair v. N.C. Ing, 21 P.3d 452, 458 (Haw. 2001) (“Over a 
century ago, the United States Supreme Court held that a third party not in privity of contract with an 
attorney may not maintain a legal malpractice action against an attorney for negligence absent fraud or 
collusion.”). 
91. See Barcelo v. Elliott, 923 S.W.2d 575, 578–79 (Tex. 1996) (“[T]he greater good is served by 
preserving a bright-line privity rule which denies a cause of action to all beneficiaries whom the attorney 
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safekeeping of property rule to impose a broad obligation on lawyers to 
sequester funds or property acquired during the representation of a client 
that is claimed by unsecured creditors would be inconsistent with the strict 
privity rule followed in states such as Texas,92 and with the policy of 
avoiding the imposition of conflicting duties that interfere with the 
representation of an existing client.  The principles of limited liability to 
nonclients that, through countless decisions,93 have become part of the law 
of virtually every jurisdiction, must ultimately be squared with any expansive 
interpretation of the duties owed to third persons under state ethics rules 
related to safekeeping of property. 
Issues related to lack of privity sometimes arise in cases where a client, 
but not the client’s lawyer, has promised some third person payments from 
the proceeds of a case.94  In Yorgan v. Durkin,95 a chiropractor brought an 
action against his patient’s lawyer seeking to enforce an assignment executed 
unilaterally by the patient, without the lawyer’s knowledge or consent, 
purportedly giving the chiropractor a lien against proceeds that would be 
recovered from the patient’s personal injury claim.96  In holding that the 
 
did not represent.  This will ensure that attorneys may in all cases zealously represent their clients 
without the threat of suit from third parties compromising that representation.”). 
92. See, e.g., In re Sunpoint Sec., Inc., 377 B.R. 513, 556–57 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2007) (“Texas has 
adopted that strict privity approach in holding that only clients may recover from attorneys on a 
negligence theory.” (citing Belt v. Oppenheimer, Blend, Harrison & Tate, Inc., 192 S.W.3d 780, 782–
83 (Tex. 2006))). 
93. For example, in Flaherty-Wiebel v. Morris, Downing & Sherred, a woman (Flaherty) sued the 
lawyer and law firm who represented her former husband (Wiebel) in drafting a pre-nuptial agreement.  
Flaherty-Wiebel v. Morris, Downing, & Sherred, 384 F. App’x 173, 176 (3d Cir. 2010).  In rejecting the 
woman’s claim for legal malpractice, the Third Circuit wrote: 
In this case, Flaherty has not alleged facts that support the existence of an attorney-client 
relationship with the defendants.  As Flaherty admits, Wiebel notified Flaherty that the defendants 
represented Wiebel and drafted the documents as Wiebel’s attorneys, and that Flaherty should 
not contact the defendants about the pre-nuptial agreement.  Moreover, Flaherty was represented 
by her own counsel during the negotiation of the pre-nuptial agreement.  Although the defendants 
had previously drafted estate planning documents for Flaherty[,] Flaherty’s allegations do not 
establish an attorney-client relationship with respect to the pre-nuptial agreement.  Since Flaherty 
was not represented by the defendants during the negotiation of the pre-nuptial agreement, she 
cannot sustain a claim for legal malpractice based on their performance in drafting this agreement. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
94. See Morrill, supra note 39, at 10 (“[W]hile a simple contractual obligation between the client 
and third party might be a claim against the client, it would not be a legitimate claim against the funds 
in trust.”). 
95. Yorgan v. Durkin, 715 N.W.2d 160 (Wis. 2006). 
96. Id. at 161. 
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lien was not enforceable against the attorney, the Supreme Court of 
Wisconsin wrote: 
In our view, it is significant whether the attorney has signed the agreement 
or otherwise accepted its terms.  Here, applying basic contract principles, we 
determine that Attorney Durkin was not a party to the agreement and not 
bound by it.  Dr. Yorgan had no reasonable expectation that Durkin would 
be bound by the agreement if he did not sign it.  Likewise, Yorgan had no 
reasonable reliance interest in Durkin’s acceptance or rejection of the 
agreement.97 
The Yorgan court went on to note that, according to the “great weight” of 
authority, a lawyer is not bound by a letter of protection given to a medical 
provider which the lawyer did not sign or send.98  Further, the court 
cautioned against the risk of turning lawyers into involuntary bill collectors, 
writing: 
We see no readily discernable stopping point on attorney liability if liability 
is imposed for the reasons [Dr.] Yorgan advances.  A variety of client creditors 
would need only send the client’s attorney a copy of their agreements with the 
client in order to enlist the attorney as a de facto collection agent . . . .  Putting 
attorneys in this position may compromise their duties to their clients.99 
 F. Attorney Immunity from Civil Liability 
In some jurisdictions, civil claims by third persons alleging that a lawyer 
has violated ethical duties related to the safekeeping of property may be 
barred by an immunity.  For example, Texas recognizes a very broad 
attorney immunity doctrine.  In Cantey Hanger, L.L.P. v. Byrd,100 the Texas 
Supreme Court wrote: 
Texas common law is well settled that an attorney does not owe a 
professional duty of care to third parties who are damaged by the attorney’s 
negligent representation of a client.  However, Texas courts have developed a 
more comprehensive affirmative defense protecting attorneys from liability to 
[nonclients], stemming from the broad declaration over a century ago that 
“attorneys are authorized to practice their profession, to advise their clients 
 
97. Id. at 164. 
98. Id. at 166. 
99. Id. at 168. 
100. Cantey Hanger, L.L.P. v. Byrd, 467 S.W.3d 477 (Tex. 2015). 
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and interpose any defense or supposed defense, without making themselves 
liable for damages.”  This attorney-immunity defense is intended to ensure 
“loyal, faithful, and aggressive representation by attorneys employed as 
advocates.” 
In accordance with this purpose, there is consensus among the courts of 
appeals that, as a general rule, attorneys are immune from civil liability to 
[nonclients] “for actions taken in connection with representing a client in 
litigation.”  Even conduct that is “wrongful in the context of the underlying 
suit” is not actionable if it is “part of the discharge of the lawyer’s duties in 
representing his or her client.”  
. . . . 
Fraud is not an exception to attorney immunity; rather, the defense does not 
extend to fraudulent conduct that is outside the scope of an attorney’s legal 
representation of his client, just as it does not extend to other wrongful 
conduct outside the scope of representation.  An attorney who pleads the 
affirmative defense of attorney immunity has the burden to prove that his 
alleged wrongful conduct, regardless of whether it is labeled fraudulent, is part 
of the discharge of his duties to his client.101 
This broad rule of attorney immunity articulated by the Texas Supreme 
Court may bar actions for damages alleging that an attorney improperly 
dispensed funds or property in which a third person claimed an interest.  
The rule may also bar claims by third persons for forfeiture of disputed 
funds paid to the lawyer, with the consent of the lawyer’s client, as attorney’s 
fees.  This is true because forfeiture (also called disgorgement102) is a civil 
 
101. Id. at 481, 484 (first citing Barcelo v. Elliott, 923 S.W.2d 575, 577 (Tex. 1996); then citing 
McCamish, Martin, Brown & Loeffler v. F.E. Appling Interests, 991 S.W.2d 787, 792 (Tex. 1999); then 
citing Kruegel v. Murphy, 126 S.W. 343, 345 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1910, no writ); then citing Mitchell v. 
Chapman, 10 S.W.3d 810, 812 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2000, no pet.); then citing Alpert v. Crain, Caton & 
James, P.C., 178 S.W.3d 398, 405 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.); then citing Toles v. 
Toles, 113 S.W.3d 899, 910 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, no pet.); then citing Renfroe v. Jones & Assocs., 
947 S.W.2d 285, 287–88 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1997, no pet.); then citing Toles, S.W.3d at 406; then 
citing Dixon Fin. Servs., Ltd. v. Greenberg, Peden, Siegmyer & Oshman, P.C., No. 01–06–00696–CV, 
2008 WL 746548, at *7 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 20, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op.); then citing 
id. at *9; and then citing Alpert, 178 S.W.3d at 408). 
102. As the Swinnea v. ERI Consulting Engineers, Inc. court explained: 
Disgorgement is an equitable forfeiture of benefits wrongfully obtained . . . .  [I]t is applicable 
where a person who renders service to another in a relationship of trust breaches that trust.  
Disgorgement is compensatory, but it is not damages.  The central purpose of forfeiture is to 
protect relationships of trust by discouraging agents’ disloyalty.  Where a fiduciary takes advantage 
of his position of trust to induce a principal to enter into a contract, the fiduciary is not entitled 
to compensation.  Thus, when a fiduciary fraudulently induced a contract, this breach of fiduciary 
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remedy103 measured not by what the plaintiff lost (damages), but by what 
the defendant gained wrongfully (e.g., restitution).104  Restitution is 
awarded to prevent unjust enrichment105 in cases involving a lawyer’s clear 
and serious breach of duty.106  In Cantey Hanger, the Texas Supreme Court 
 
duty may give rise to equitable forfeiture of contractual consideration.  Forfeiture may be 
appropriate even if the party who was fraudulently induced into the contract fails to suffer harm 
or when he can be fully compensated by damages. 
Equitable forfeiture is distinguishable from an award of actual damages incurred as a result of 
a breach of fiduciary duty.  Further, a claimant need not prove actual damages to succeed on a 
claim for forfeiture because they address different wrongs.  In addition to serving as a deterrence, 
forfeiture can serve as restitution to a principal who did not receive the benefit of the bargain due 
to his agent’s breach of fiduciary duties. 
Swinnea v. ERI Consulting Eng’rs, Inc., 481 S.W.3d 747, 752–53 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2016, no pet.) 
(first citing In re Longview Energy Co., 464 S.W.3d 353, 361 (Tex. 2015); then citing Burrow v. Arce, 
997 S.W.2d 229, 238 (Tex. 1999); then citing ERI Consulting Eng’rs, Inc. 318 S.W.3d 867, 873–74 
(Tex. 2010); then citing id. at 882; then citing id. at 874; then citing Burrow, 997 S.W.2d at 240; and then 
citing id. at 237–38). 
103. See Sw. Energy Prod. Co. v. Berry-Helfand, 491 S.W.3d 699, 729 (Tex. 2016) (“While 
equitable disgorgement is a viable remedy for breach of trust by a fiduciary we have not expressly limited 
the remedy to fiduciary relationships nor foreclosed equitable relief for breach of trust in other types of 
confidential relationships.” (emphasis added) (first citing ERI Consulting, 318 S.W.3d at 873; and then 
citing 2 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 43 (AM. LAW INST. 
2011))); see also 2 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 43 (AM. LAW 
INST. 2011) (discussing “the nature and extent of the remedy in restitution”). 
104. See Cooper v. Campbell, No. 05-15-00340-CV, 2016 WL 4487924, at *10–11 (Tex. App.—
Dallas Aug. 24, 2016, no pet.) (“Disgorgement is an equitable forfeiture of benefits wrongfully 
obtained.  A party must plead forfeiture to be entitled to that equitable remedy. . . .  The central purpose 
of forfeiture as an equitable remedy is not to compensate the injured principal, but to protect 
relationships of trust by discouraging disloyalty.” (emphasis added) (first citing Longview, 464 S.W.3d 
at 361; then citing Swinnea, 481 S.W.3d at 752; then citing Alavi v. MCI Worldcom Network Servs., 
Inc., No. 09-05-364 CV, 2007 WL 274565, at *3 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Feb. 1, 2007, no pet.) (mem. 
op.); and then citing Lee v. Lee, 47 S.W.3d 767, 780 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.))); 
see also Kokesh v. S.E.C., 137 S. Ct. 1635, 1639 (2017) (“A 5-year statute of limitations applies to any 
‘action, suit or proceeding for the enforcement of any civil fine, penalty, or forfeiture, pecuniary or 
otherwise.’  This case presents the question whether § 2462 applies to claims for disgorgement imposed 
as a sanction for violating a federal securities law.  The Court holds that it does.  Disgorgement in the 
securities-enforcement context is a ‘penalty’ within the meaning of 2462, and so disgorgement actions 
must be commenced within five years of the date the claim accrues.” (emphasis added) (citation 
omitted)). 
105. See Kokesh, 137 S. Ct. at 1640 (“Generally, disgorgement is a form of ‘[r]estitution measured 
by the defendant’s wrongful gain.’  Disgorgement requires that the defendant give up ‘those gains . . . 
properly attributable to the defendant’s interference with the claimant’s legally protected rights.’” 
(citation omitted) (citing 2 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 51, 
cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2011))). 
106. See 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 37 cmt. b (AM. LAW 
INST. 2000) (“The remedy of fee forfeiture presupposes . . . a lawyer’s clear and serious violation of a 
duty . . . .”). 
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noted that, although “attorneys are immune from civil liability to 
[nonclients]”107 for conduct that was “part of the discharge of his [or her] 
duties to his client[,]”108 there are “other mechanisms . . . in place to 
discourage and remedy such conduct, such as sanctions, contempt, and 
attorney disciplinary proceedings.”109 
IV.    CONCLUSION 
It is easy to find in legal literature expansive language about the duties 
owed by a lawyer to third persons with respect to funds or property held by 
the lawyer.  However, care must be exercised when interpreting state 
versions of Model Rule 1.15, the rule on safekeeping of property.  
Otherwise, the duties that a lawyer owes to third persons will too readily 
encroach on the performance of obligations owed to clients, as well as on 
the legitimate interests of lawyers themselves, especially with regard to the 
payment of fees for services they have performed.110 
As numerous authorities have recognized, lawyers should be obliged to 
protect the property interests of third persons only where those persons 
hold a matured legal or equitable interest in the specific funds or property 
held by the lawyer.  This generally means that in order to be entitled to 
protection (by way of safekeeping, notice, delivery, or sequestration in 
escrow), a third person must be known by the lawyer to hold a lawful interest 
in the relevant funds or property by way of assignment, lien, court order, 
judgment, statute, or letter of protection.  The assertion of an unmatured 
claim by an unsecured creditor should not be sufficient to impose on a 
lawyer obligations to a third person that are inconsistent with the 
instructions of the lawyer’s client. 
Interpreting the safekeeping rule to create duties to unsecured creditors 
would create chaos in the legal profession.  This is true because unhappy 
 
107. Cantey Hanger, L.L.P. v. Byrd, 467 S.W.3d 477, 481 (Tex. 2015). 
108. Id. at 484 (citing Dixon Fin. Servs., Ltd. v. Greenberg, Peden, Siegmyer & Oshman, P.C., 
No. 01–06–00696–CV, 2008 WL 746548, at *9 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 20, 2008, no 
pet.) (mem. op.); Alpert v. Crain, Caton & James, P.C., 178 S.W.3d 398, 408 (Tex. App.—Houston 
[1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.)). 
109. Id. at 482 (footnote omitted) (first citing Reagan Nat’l Advert. of Austin, Inc. v. Hazen, 
No. 03–05–00699–CV, 2008 WL 2938823, at *3 (Tex. App.—Austin July 29, 2008, no pet.) 
(mem. op.); and then citing Renfroe v. Jones & Assocs., 947 S.W.2d 285, 287 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 
1997, no pet.)). 
110. Cf. Perdue, supra note 80, at 64–65 (“How the attorney earns their fee and is able to pay 
expenses such that they can do the work for the client (as should be their paramount duty) is 
unanswered by the proponents of the rule.”). 
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individuals, aggressive creditors, over-reaching entities, and other nonclients 
would be given enormous power “to tie up the funds for an indeterminate 
amount of time,” and would enjoy “heavy leverage” to extract the maximum 
amount from clients who need assets immediately.111 
  
 
111. Id. at 65. 
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